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For some months now, we have been at work on a project called
‘‘Grouping Data.’’ In it, we address several specific questions (e.g., Under
what circumstances should we group data? If the appropriate circumstances
exist, how ought we proceed?). But our overarching message is a simple one:
the decisions we make over how to group data may crucially affect the
inferences we reach.
This certainly holds for ‘‘Does Age Matter?’’ In it, Manning, Carroll, and
Carp group a continuous variable, age, into three categories or cohorts:
15 under the age of 46; 25 46–64; and 35 651. When they enter this
(now ordinal-level, treated as if it were interval-level) variable into a logistic
regression model designed to explain judicial decisions in age discrimination
cases (coded 0 if the judge ruled against the plaintiff alleging age
discrimination and 1 if in favor of the plaintiff ), it produces a positive
and statistically significant coefficient; when they enter this same cohort-age
variable into a model designed to explain outcomes in litigation alleging
discrimination based on race or gender, it yields an insignificant coefficient.
Taken together, these results lead the authors to conclude that age ‘‘matters’’
in precisely those cases in which they expect it to matter—age discrimination
suits—and that it does not matter in those cases in which they expect it not
to matter—race and gender discrimination suits.
As it turns out, though, this conclusion—and, more important, the
inference that Manning and his colleagues reach based on their sample of
data—rests entirely on their grouping decision. Specifically, if we respecify
the models in precisely the same way as the authors but vary the cutoff
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points on the age-cohort variable, we find that for age discrimination cases,
only 2 of 23 (plausible) cutoff points produce results in line with the
authors’ expectation.
These findings may bring into question the authors’ inferences about the
importance (or lack thereof ) of age on their own terms. But because their
‘‘own terms’’ rely on some strong (and unnecessary) assumptions,1 we
thought it prudent to properly specify the model, creating two indicator
variables to represent the age cohorts rather than entering a single variable
with three categories. The outcomes from this set of analyses are even
starker: only when we code the age variables exactly as the Manning team
has done (i.e., select its chosen cutoff points) does the effect of age run in the
hypothesized direction; no other grouping choices produce the expected
findings.2
In what follows, we elaborate on these results. We also present analyses of
the effect of age on judicial decisions in race and gender cases.
Age and Judicial Outcomes in Age Discrimination Litigation: The Manning
et al. Specification
‘‘Does Age Matter?,’’ as we note above, slices the continuous variable of
age into three cohorts: judges 45 years old and younger (Cohort 1), those
46–64 years old (Cohort 2), and judges 65 years and older (Cohort 3). Since
65 is the traditional age of retirement, the Cohort 3 cutoff value makes
reasonable substantive sense. The value of 45, however, seems arbitrary—
and the authors’ explanation for it not particularly helpful in justifying or
clarifying their decision.
In light of the lack of a theoretically or intuitively pleasing account for the
‘‘45’’ grouping decision, we thought it prudent to determine just how
sensitive the Manning et al. results were to it. Accordingly, we fit the three-
cohort model for age discrimination cases for all cutoff points between
Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 ranging from 40–62;3 we left the third cohort at
1See the section ‘‘The Three-Cohort Model Using a Proper Specification’’ for more details.
2Our purpose here is to demonstrate how grouping decisions may affect inference; it is not
to account for the results of our analyses. Nonetheless, it is probably true that our findings
will not come as much of a surprise to judicial specialists. After all, for over a decade now they
have attempted to explore whether male and female and black and white judges reach distinct
decisions—with their findings mixed at best (for recent reviews, see Epstein and Mather,
2003; Schneider, 2001). If race and gender, typically stable characteristics, do not (depending
on the study) significantly affect judicial decisions, then we might hypothesize an even lesser
role for aging (which we all, with any luck, undergo). This may be especially so for litigation
involving the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which not only protects ‘‘the elderly’’
(unless we define 40 as ‘‘elderly’’) from employment discrimination based on age, but also
covers individuals who are 40 years of age or older.
3Moving the cutoff point to lower than 40 or higher than 62 left too few judges in either
Cohort 1 or 2 to make analyses sensible.
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65.4 In all other ways, we followed the authors’ approach: we included the
two other variables they found to be significant determinants of age
discrimination decisions (political party and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)) (see Model A in their Table 2) and we used
logistic regression, estimated via maximum likelihood.
Table 1 presents the results, in particular the Z-scores for all feasible cutoff
points. If a score falls below 1.96, then we can conclude that age exerts a
statistically significant negative effect (for level of significance a5 0.05) on
judicial decisions in age discrimination litigation; if it falls above 1.96, then
we can conclude the variable exerts a statistically significant positive effect. If
TABLE1
Z-scores (Coefficients Divided by Standard Errors) for All Explanatory Variables
in the Authors’ Model A (Table 2) Using All Feasible Cutoff Values
Cutoff Intercept Age Cohort Party ADEA
40  3.448 1.437 2.055 2.030
41  3.632 1.608 2.021 2.062
42  3.914 1.871 1.983 2.098
43  4.129 2.063 1.979 2.096
44  4.049 1.877 2.006 2.062
45  4.496 2.324 1.929 2.135
46  3.889 1.454 2.072 1.997
47  4.145 1.703 2.014 2.051
48  4.017 1.379 2.080 1.972
49  3.798 1.022 2.153 1.923
50  3.638 0.711 2.216 1.863
51  3.459 0.403 2.279 1.817
52  3.692 0.574 2.238 1.850
53  3.553 0.306 2.277 1.804
54  3.947 0.689 2.197 1.873
55  3.792 0.401 2.271 1.821
56  3.693 0.179 2.324 1.777
57  3.802 0.200 2.315 1.782
58  3.406  0.469 2.461 1.661
59  3.547  0.366 2.437 1.671
60  3.852  0.037 2.353 1.731
61  4.308 0.514 2.230 1.845
62  4.555 0.758 2.165 1.891
NOTE: The first age cohort is defined as those judges less than or equal to the cutoff; in the
second are those older than the cutoff and younger than 65; and the third contains those
judges age 65 and older. The boldfaced row is the one reported by the authors.
4We want to reiterate that this approach to incorporating age in the model—as a variable
with three categories rather than as two indicator variables—requires some very strong
assumptions that we (and probably the authors themselves) would prefer not to make.
Nonetheless, because we think it important to reproduce their analysis, we follow their
approach here; in the next section, we incorporate age in a more appropriate fashion.
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the score falls between these values, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of ‘‘no effect.’’
Notice that we were able to replicate the authors’ results: when age is set at
their cutoff points, it—along with party and ADEA—significantly affects
judicial decisions in the hypothesized direction (i.e., older judges are more
likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs in age cases). But—and this is a big but—
while the party and ADEA variables show stable effects across all
specifications, the age-cohort variable does not. In fact, it is only statistically
significant in 2 of the 23 possibilities. At the conventional level of significance
(a5 0.05), we would expect to find a significant relationship in just over
one possibility due solely to chance alone.
Figure 1 and Table 2 reinforce these results. In the former we plot the
absolute value of the Z-scores, with the horizontal line set at 1.96. As we can
see, the findings are simply not robust. In the latter, provided for
completeness, we present the estimated coefficients for all three explanatory
variables. Again, while the magnitudes of the party and ADEA variables
TABLE2
Estimated Coefficients for All Explanatory Variables in the Authors’ Model A
(Table 2) Using All Feasible Cutoff Values
Cutoff Intercept Age Cohort Party ADEA
40  1.627 0.275 0.388 0.401
41  1.691 0.303 0.382 0.407
42  1.782 0.344 0.374 0.414
43  1.839 0.371 0.373 0.412
44  1.724 0.324 0.378 0.405
45  1.867 0.389 0.364 0.420
46  1.496 0.227 0.390 0.391
47  1.568 0.260 0.380 0.403
48  1.423 0.199 0.392 0.385
49  1.300 0.143 0.406 0.376
50  1.198 0.096 0.418 0.363
51  1.108 0.053 0.430 0.354
52  1.147 0.073 0.423 0.362
53  1.075 0.038 0.432 0.353
54  1.164 0.084 0.416 0.367
55  1.092 0.048 0.429 0.357
56  1.039 0.021 0.439 0.349
57  1.041 0.023 0.438 0.350
58  0.902  0.053 0.466 0.325
59  0.925  0.041 0.462 0.328
60  0.991  0.004 0.448 0.340
61  1.095 0.056 0.423 0.363
62  1.136 0.082 0.411 0.372
NOTE: The first age cohort is defined as those judges less than or equal to the cutoff; in the
second are those older than the cutoff and younger than 65; and the third contains those
judges age 65 and older. The boldfaced row is the one reported by the authors.
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remain steady across the specifications, the impact of age cohort varies
considerably.
The Three-Cohort Model Using a Proper Specification
The approach we have taken thus far to the age-cohort variable
corresponds to the authors’, and can be represented as follows:
mi ¼ b0 þ b1Age Cohorti þ b2Partyi þ b3ADEAi ð1Þ
Characterizing the variable in this way implies that the difference in the
linear predictor (as well as the predicted probability) between Cohorts 1 and
2 is precisely the same as the difference between Cohorts 2 and 3. To be sure,
this may turn out to be the case ex post but it is an unnecessary (and un-
necessarily strong) assumption to make at the onset;5 it may even be an














Absolute Values of Z-Scores (Coefficients Divided by Standard Errors) for the
Age-Cohort Variable in the Authors’ Model A (Table 2)
Using All Feasible Cutoff Values
NOTE: The first age cohort is defined as those judges less than or equal to the
cutoff; in the second are those older than the cutoff and younger than 65; and
the third contains those judges age 65 and older. Forty-five is the cutoff used by
the authors.
5From our perspective there seem to be two model-based justifications for grouping data in
this fashion. One is a strong theory that prescribes precise cutoff values and cohort effects; the
other is when estimating an additional parameter is too costly due to an extremely small
sample size.
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unwise one for this particular project given Manning et al.’s claims in their
footnote 5.6 A far more preferable initial strategy is to rewrite the model
with two indicator variables:
mi ¼ b0 þ b1Age Cohort 2i þ b2Age Cohort 3i þ b3Partyi
þ b4ADEAi ð2Þ
This specification leaves the first age cohort (those judges less than or equal to
the cutoff value) as the baseline category. Of course, the choice of that baseline
is completely arbitrary but in no way does it affect the findings. We also should
note that if the estimated coefficient for Cohort 3 is twice the size of the
coefficient for Cohort 2, then the authors’ strategy (Equation (1)) is reasonable.
Otherwise, the respecification above (Equation (2)) is preferred.
As it turns out, the estimated coefficients support the wisdom of the two-
indicator approach (see Table 4). Perhaps even more interesting, though, are
the Z-scores for all variables in the respecified model, which Table 3 depicts.
Note that for the cutoff value invoked in the Manning et al. paper,
significant effects emerge for the two cohorts: both are more likely to
support the plaintiff in age discrimination cases. But that is the only cutoff
where both cohort effects are significant. If the cutoff is between 56 and 62,
the model suggests that those in Cohort 2 are less likely than those in Cohort 1 to
support plaintiffs in age discrimination cases. Only when the cutoff is set at the
authors’ choice of 45 does the effect run in the hypothesized direction. The results
are similar for Cohort 3: only when we establish the cutoff at 43 or 45 do the
judges exhibit a statistically significant difference from the baseline (Cohort 1).
For completeness and purposes of comparison (with Table 2 and
Figure 1) we present the estimated coefficients of all explanatory variables
(in Table 4) and the absolute values of the Z-scores for the age variables
(in Figure 2). The results parallel those we obtained using the authors’
specification: while the coefficients for the party and ADEA variables remain
relatively constant across specifications, the age-cohort variables do not.
6Specifically, the authors offer the following explanation for their choice of grouping age
into cohorts rather than treating it as a continuous variable: ‘‘[W]e don’t anticipate that the
effect of age will be perfectly linear along the age spectrum. There is no theoretical
justification to believe that as a judge ages by one year we would anticipate that they would
exhibit a correspondingly incremental increase in support for older litigants. We anticipate
that differences will emerge among the very oldest and youngest jurists.’’ In light of this
claim, it seems particularly ill advised to expect the difference between Cohorts 1 and 2 and 2
and 3 to be precisely the same.
As an aside, Manning and his colleagues (correctly) note that age, when left as a continuous
variable, is not a significant predictor of judicial decisions in age discrimination cases (see
their footnote 18). The full results are as follows:
Estimate SE Z Value Pr(4|z|)
(Intercept)  0.8831 0.6453  1.37 0.1711
Age  0.0020 0.0106  0.18 0.8533
Party 0.4539 0.1892 2.40 0.0165
ADEA 0.3346 0.1963 1.70 0.0883
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Taken collectively, our analyses so far suggest an effect of age only if we
are willing to accept (for whatever reason) the Manning et al. cutoff of 45.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we could, say, develop a
plausible story to support the authors’ grouping decision. What we still must
determine is whether the estimated coefficients for Cohort 2 and Cohort 3
differ significantly in the hypothesized direction (i.e., the effect of Cohort 3
should be significantly greater than that of Cohort 2). We can do so by
testing the null hypothesis that b2 ¼ b3using a likelihood ratio test. The test
statistic is 1.165, which is distributed as a w2 random variable with one
degree of freedom. The associated p-value is 0.720—meaning that there is
no statistically significant difference between the estimated coefficient for
Cohort 2 and Cohort 3; whatever difference exists is likely due to chance
alone. This, in turn, suggests that a single threshold exists at age 45; there are
no differences between those judges above and below age 45, given this
cutoff.
TABLE3
Z-Scores (Coefficients Divided by Standard Errors) for All Explanatory Variables in
the Authors’ Model A (Table 2) Using All Feasible Cutoff Values and the
Specification in Equation (2)
Cutoff Intercept Age Cohort 2 Age Cohort 3 Party ADEA
40  2.172 0.085 0.683 1.995 2.060
41  2.675 0.551 1.125 2.003 2.059
42  3.323 1.178 1.703 2.029 2.031
43  3.742 1.592 2.073 2.091 1.931
44  3.808 1.152 1.766 2.035 1.985
45  4.585 2.011 2.475 2.071 1.940
46  3.920 0.340 1.258 1.992 2.049
47  4.356 0.806 1.616 1.982 2.052
48  4.344 0.239 1.281 1.988 2.049
49  4.138  0.371 0.936 2.002 2.066
50  4.047  0.906 0.666 2.018 2.101
51  3.915  1.432 0.418 2.037 2.131
52  4.264  1.131 0.678 2.037 2.063
53  4.198  1.601 0.486 2.111 2.049
54  4.678  0.972 0.874 2.049 2.053
55  4.541  1.527 0.692 2.056 2.032
56  4.453  2.015 0.579 2.051 1.978
57  4.640  2.088 0.643 2.066 2.002
58  4.410  3.541 0.256 2.136 2.074
59  4.554  3.585 0.363 2.158 2.010
60  4.857  3.215 0.571 2.236 1.952
61  5.247  2.310 0.948 2.099 1.990
62  5.567  2.021 1.109 2.110 2.096
NOTE: The first age cohort is defined as those judges less than or equal to the cutoff; in the
second are those older than the cutoff and younger than 65; and the third contains those
judges age 65 and older. The boldfaced row is the one reported by the authors.
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Race, Gender, and Judicial Outcomes in Age Discrimination Litigation
To bolster their claims about the importance of age, Manning and his
colleagues make an interesting move: they assert that age should matter only
in the resolution of age discrimination litigation, not in the outcomes of
suits alleging discrimination based on race and gender. Since they
demonstrate the veracity of this claim using the same age-cohort variable
and the same specification as they invoked for age discrimination litigation,
we thought it appropriate to analyze the impact of their decisions—the
chosen cutoff points, as well as the use of one variable to represent age (see
Equation (1))—on their results.
For the sake of space, Table 5 presents the Z-scores for the age-cohort
variables only—with columns labeled ‘‘Original’’ using the authors’
specification (Equation (1)) and columns labeled ‘‘Cohort 2’’ and ‘‘Cohort
3’’ invoking the more appropriate specification (Equation (2)). Beginning
with the outcomes in race discrimination cases, if we use the authors’
TABLE4
Estimated Coefficients for All Explanatory Variables in the Authors’ Model A
(Table 2) Using All Feasible Cutoff Values and the Specification in Equation (2)
Cutoff Intercept Age Cohort 2 Age Cohort 3 Party ADEA
40  1.143 0.044 0.365 0.379 0.408
41  1.362 0.274 0.583 0.381 0.408
42  1.633 0.566 0.854 0.386 0.403
43  1.796 0.753 1.018 0.400 0.384
44  1.497 0.443 0.721 0.388 0.394
45  1.764 0.752 0.987 0.396 0.386
46  1.182 0.098 0.406 0.378 0.406
47  1.285 0.226 0.509 0.377 0.407
48  1.146 0.061 0.370 0.378 0.406
49  1.038  0.089 0.258 0.380 0.409
50  0.963  0.210 0.177 0.384 0.417
51  0.899  0.323 0.108 0.388 0.423
52  0.954  0.247 0.171 0.388 0.409
53  0.911  0.345 0.120 0.403 0.407
54  0.995  0.208 0.211 0.390 0.407
55  0.947  0.327 0.164 0.392 0.403
56  0.912  0.441 0.134 0.391 0.393
57  0.928  0.471 0.147 0.394 0.398
58  0.858  0.873 0.057 0.412 0.415
59  0.877  0.965 0.081 0.416 0.402
60  0.925  0.956 0.126 0.431 0.390
61  0.992  0.750 0.207 0.401 0.396
62  1.037  0.762 0.240 0.403 0.416
NOTE: The first age cohort is defined as those judges less than or equal to the cutoff; in the
second are those older than the cutoff and younger than 65; and the third contains those
judges age 65 and older. The boldfaced row is the one reported by the authors.
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specification, the findings are as they report: the age cohort never exerts a
statistically significant effect on the outcomes of these cases. The more
appropriate two-variable approach, however, yields a different set of results:
for a large number of plausible cutoff values, Cohort 2 judges are
significantly less likely to decide in favor of those alleging discrimination

































Absolute Value of Z-Scores (Coefficients Divided by Standard Errors) for the
Age-Cohort Variable in the Authors’ Model A (Table 2) Using All Feasible Cutoff
Values and the Specification in Equation (2)
NOTE: The first age cohort is defined as those judges less than or equal to the
cutoff; in the second are those older than the cutoff and younger than 65; and
the third contains those judges age 65 and older.
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than are those in Cohort 1 (though no significant differences ever emerge
between Cohort 3 and Cohort 1 judges).
Turning to the gender discrimination cases, whether we consider the
original or more appropriate specification, we observe a number of cutoff
values that produce significant results. So, for example, if we group the data
between 56 and 63, there is evidence that those judges in Cohort 3 are more
likely than those in Cohort 1 to support the result favored by the plaintiff.
Even more intriguing is that if we use the authors’ cutoff of 45, significant
differences too emerge—with Cohort 2 judges less likely to support claims
of gender discrimination than their counterparts in Cohort 1.
Discussion
Does age matter? This is the question that Manning and his colleagues
pose, and it is one they answer in the affirmative for age discrimination suits
and in the negative for others.
TABLE5
Z-Scores for Age-Cohort Variables (Coded as a Single Variable (Original) and as
Two Dummy Variables (Cohort 2 and Cohort 3) for the Race and Gender
Discrimination Models Presented in the Authors’ Table 3
Cutoff
Race Gender
Original Chohort 2 Chohort 3 Original Chohort 2 Chohort 3
40  0.102  0.653  0.589 1.787  0.776 0.029
41  0.635  2.005  1.809 1.678  0.924  0.002
42  0.690  1.891  1.633 1.663  0.835 0.175
43  0.587  1.517  1.254 1.459  1.244  0.128
44  0.563  1.399  1.120 1.207  1.666  0.388
45  0.468  1.108  0.825 0.950  1.971  0.449
46  0.398  0.938  0.669 1.007  1.681  0.019
47  0.783  1.625  1.146 0.932  1.699 0.135
48  0.970  1.913  1.283 0.568  2.250  0.096
49  1.416  2.654  1.716 0.343  2.582  0.183
50  1.098  2.072  1.279 0.250  2.701  0.140
51  1.074  2.012  1.171 0.617  2.028 0.421
52  1.325  2.442  1.371 0.776  1.741 0.724
53  0.877  1.665  0.860 1.167  1.061 1.214
54  0.620  1.224  0.573 1.006  1.367 1.143
55  0.935  1.793  0.817 1.200  1.059 1.384
56  1.163  2.241  0.952 1.386  0.762 1.584
57  1.513  2.950  1.165 2.026 0.376 2.120
58  1.199  2.444  0.879 2.197 0.675 2.253
59  1.308  2.803  0.902 2.162 0.577 2.226
60  1.216  2.742  0.819 2.008 0.201 2.119
61  1.014  2.582  0.630 1.928  0.093 2.066
62  0.878  2.631  0.518 2.001  0.053 2.104
NOTE: The boldfaced row is the one reported by the authors.
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Whether they have reached a good inference is the question we pose, and
it is one we leave to readers to answer based on the analyses we have
presented. For our primary purpose here was not to undermine the authors’
study but rather to investigate whether and in what ways their ‘‘data
grouping’’ (and, to a lesser extent, their model specification) choices affected
their conclusions.
This much we think we have accomplished—with the overall findings
taking us back to our starting point: the decisions we make over how to
group data may crucially affect the inferences we reach. To see this, we need
only consider the answer Manning et al. might have derived had they
continued to invoke the single-variable specification of age but set their first
cutpoint just one year higher or lower than 45: that age is not significantly
related to outcomes in age discrimination cases. On the other hand, had they
made different grouping decisions in their analyses of race and gender cases,
they might have reported far different results—that, in fact, age ‘‘matters’’ in
the resolution of these cases.
In light of the critical role grouping choices play in making inferences,
what steps should researchers take to ensure that those they make are of the
highest quality? Since we address this in our larger project—the product of
which we hope to disseminate shortly—suffice it to note here that we urge
scholars to consider, as a threshold matter, whether the circumstances are
such that they should be grouping data. If not, they ought avoid it altogether
and make use of a linear or, if the project so dictates, a nonlinear
specification.7 That is because grouping ungrouped data is a procedure that
7Given the authors’ notions about the relationship between judicial age and outcomes in
age discrimination suits (see our footnote 6), we thought it reasonable to fit a model with the
natural logarithm of age as a covariate, as well as a quadratic specification with age and age-
squared. As was the case when we entered age as a continuous variable (again, see footnote 6),
in neither of these specifications was age a statistically significant predictor of outcomes. The
results are as follows.
Estimate SE Z Value Pr(4|z|)
(Intercept)  0.7577 2.3957  0.32 0.7518
In(Age)  0.0593 0.5885  0.10 0.9198
Party 0.4500 0.1885 2.39 0.0170
ADEA 0.3384 0.1954 1.73 0.0833
Logistic regression with the natural logarithm of age as an independent variable.
Estimate SE Z Value Pr(4|z|)
(Intercept)  3.2533 3.1748  1.02 0.3055
Age 0.0839 0.1190 0.74 0.4580
Age2  0.0008 0.0010  0.76 0.4458
Party  0.4794 0.1924 2.49 0.0127
ADEA 0.2963 0.2022 1.47 0.1428
Logistic regression with age and age-squared as independent variables.
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almost always discards information and thus, as a general matter, a
procedure to shun (Epstein and King, 2002). On the other hand, if
sufficient reasons exist to group, then we advise researchers to assess
systematically the extent to which their conclusions reflect their decisions.
Only by conducting the sort of sensitivity analyses that we have done here
will investigators (and their readers) have a full appreciation of just how their
grouping choices—crucial choices as it turns out—affect their findings and
resulting inferences.
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